Taleb has taught us that history can lead to probabilistic fallacies since it is only one possible path events could have taken, which necessitates a practical skepticism on our part on the appreciation of historical events. Although this can be enough to make us critical of historical assumptions, I think it is only a partial framework in evaluating ideas.
Thankfully, K.M. gives us a complimentary angle which can help us in our critical thinking: on evaluating an ideal from a moral or philosophical standpoint apart from a historical (i.e. empirical) one–which we already know from Taleb is only a partial insight.
K.M. differentiates between political ideals and political systems, and which of the two can be approached from a philosophical or moral standpoint and which can be approached from the (imperfect) historical one:
A political ideal is a moral ideal, not an economic one. A political system is an economic/organisational structure that attempts to realize political ideals. A political ideal of economic equality leads to a political system of communism (example: The Soviet Union). A political ideal of ‘equality of opportunity’ or ’social justice’ leads to a political system of socialism (example: India until the 90s). A political ideal of national superiority leads to a political system of fascism (example: China). A political ideal of liberty leads to a political system of capitalism (example: the early USA).
There is no such thing as the success or failure of a political ideal.Ideals do not succeed or fail. They are accepted or rejected. While the failure of a political system might cause some people to reject (or at least question) their ideals, the failure does not prove that the ideals are wrong. As long as one still holds the same ideals, the failure of a particular political system is simply useful empirical data for constructing a better political system.
For me the implications of this insight bolster the argument for an active, rather than passive appreciation of knowledge. People whom Taleb calls naive empiricists: will simply rely on evidence and history to allow them to discern the value of an idea in practice, and leaving the theory or philosophy behind the practice neglected (a sign of intellectual laziness). What K.M. explains is that despite a concept’s failure or success in history (i.e. the system), it still is separate from the philosophical or moral value of the idea–which still bears critique. Although as he says, ideals can never be wrong but they can be rejected.
There is another angle here that bears caution: the invention of the computer and internet has brought more data and evidence at the access of more people than ever experienced in history. So while this can help critical thinking in finding historical empirical support for ideas, this can also lead to the “sharpshooter fallacy” which we described earlier–where an observer simply looks at history and ignores the theoretical framework of any concept.